Sept. 10, 2001, morning. Introduction into problems of forest technology / risk management in mountaineous terrain
Perceptions of risks in mountain forests
Gerhard Weiss
Institute of Forest Sector Policy and Economics
Universität für Bodenkultur Wien
Published in: Price M., Butt N. (eds., 2000) Forests in Sustainable Mountain Development: A State of Knowledge Report for 2000. CAB International, Oxon.
Do mountain forests produce risks?
Many Alpine regions are densely populated. Forests in mountain regions play a major role in protecting people and infrastructure against natural hazards, and while they do protect against torrents, avalanches and rock-fall, how big is this contribution to safety, and how best can it be maintained? Different groups give different answers to these questions; Austrian forest officials usually assume that mountain forests are of utmost importance for the settlement of mountain areas, but representatives of the forest-technical service for torrent and avalanche control in Austria frequently emphasise that the forests’ role in protecting against natural hazards is restricted.
Representatives of the forestry administration argue that mountain forests should be managed to maximize their value for natural hazard protection or the forests might break down and lose their damage prevention potential. Representatives of nature protection groups demand that mountain forests should be left unmanaged and suggest that natural forests already guarantee sufficient protection. Who is right? Do unmanaged mountain forests produce risks, or may they be left untouched without provoking catastrophes? In this article, the perception (and their consequences for policy-making) of risks from and for mountain forests will be discussed using theories on values, interests and institutions as well as findings from interdisciplinary risk research, and Alpine (Switzerland, Bavaria and Austria) examples.
Perception of risks
Risk is not – or not exclusively – an objective category. Risk researchers have observed that different people assess risks differently, even when provided with the same information, and conclude that 'subjective' elements also influence the assessment of risks. The traditional technocratic view (which assumes risks may be described objectively), has thus to be abandoned, or at least broadened. The subjectivity of risk assessment becomes clear when the basic definition of risk in decision theory is re-considered. In this theory benefits are weighed against potential future costs; yet benefits and costs may be evaluated differently by different actors. Technocratic risk analysis models fail to consider a powerful factor in real life decisions: the actor behind the decision - people assess risks according to their individual values as well as social norms.
Sociological risk research found that actors do not behave according to the formal rationality assumed in theory (Rosa, 1997). Although technicians tend to call this irrational behaviour, it may also be considered a different form of rationality. According to theory, risk is a question of benefits, (potential) costs and probability, whereas in practice decisions are not taken in such a transparent way. Decisions are taken unconsciously or based on perceptions; what people 'think' or 'feel' the benefits and costs might be, and their probability. Perceptions also follow social norms – people do what is considered 'normal'. Emotions, interests, values and social norms are factors (in addition to knowledge) in risk decisions, and also influence the perception of reality.
The objectivistic concepts of risk management have been applied in natural hazard research (Kienholz, 1993; Hollenstein, 1995). These authors recognise that the evaluation of risks is 'subjective' or 'political' and risk management concepts and experts cannot answer the question 'How safe is safe enough?' which refers to values and interests of people. In real life decisions, however, risk assessment and value judgements do not usually take place separately; values and interests influence the perception of risk itself, also guided by social norms developed by institutions. Considerations of the subjectivity of risk perception also apply to the question of the role of mountain forests in natural hazard prevention for which there is limited knowledge. Other factors are thus of particular importance for risk perception in mountain forests.
Values
The perception of nature and the 'necessity' of mountain forest management
Forest officials in mountainous countries in Europe generally appeal for more active management of mountain forests; in Austria, such demands have been formulated by the Ministry and silviculture scientists since the 1960s (e.g. Mayer, 1978). They argue that the natural development of forest stands includes unstable 'stages' such as the 'decomposition stage' - when old trees die and regeneration starts - susceptible to natural threats. Uncontrolled stand development may therefore lead to a large-scale forest breakdown. The scientists conclude that mountain forests need continuous management in order to maintain their protective influence. The forestry administration adopted this view and accordingly subsidizes forest owners for forest road construction and mountain forest treatment. The situation in neighbouring Switzerland and Bavaria is similar.
Another view, that natural mountain forests are particularly stable ecosystems (e.g. Meister, 1985), is shared by some foresters and environmentalists. Nature conservationists argue that before the start of human settlement in mountain areas almost the whole area was forested, and if abandoned, all cultivated land would eventually be reclaimed by forests. These arguments support the view that forests do not need our help to be stable and there is no threat of forest breakdown. On the contrary, forest management is considered destructive to mountain forests, for example producing unnatural and unstable stands susceptible to wind-throw, insect attacks and other threats. Remote mountain forests are often hardly changed by human activities due to restricted accessibility; these forests have great nature protection value and environmentalists fiercely oppose the construction of new forest roads in these areas.
Both views have firm arguments; both are based on scientific knowledge and are logically conclusive. Examples may be found for both positions; the generalizations, however, are guided by ideological beliefs that can be interpreted as different views of nature. Sieferle (1997) distinguishes two fundamental ways of how people view nature and the relationship between man and nature which may be characterized as follows:
The following two beliefs corresponding to Sieferle's concept can be formulated:
Do we expect a paradigm change in mountain forest management?
These general statements cannot be proven by science as they are beliefs which may be either true or false. Only the applications of these beliefs to certain problems may be researched scientifically; by studying practical problems, science can contribute to a more differentiated picture of reality. Further, evaluation studies may determine which statements in practical forestry and science are based on knowledge and which are based on assumptions or beliefs. There is little scientific knowledge of the natural development of mountain forests and the necessity of silvicultural intervention for risk prevention.
Recent research indicates that many cases need less intensive interventions in mountain forests than foresters tend to believe (Frey et al., 1995) - even forests damaged by wind-throw and bark beetles. In certain cases, however, treatment is imperative to prevent risky situations. An evaluation of mountain forest policy in Austria confirms these scientific findings by drawing on practical examples (Weiss, 1999). The study shows that in most cases where the forest authority fears risky situations and considers interventions necessary, the forests have been seriously damaged by overuse. Overuse is usually the result of different operations taking place at the same site, for example timber production, game management and grazing. In spite of this the forestry administration does not consider these operations, but rather the natural developments of forest stands, as problematic: this corresponds with the belief that forests can and should be controlled. Appropriate treatment of wind-throw areas (a recent issue in Bavaria and Switzerland) led to the launch of an ambitious research programme in Switzerland (Frey et al., 1995); changes in silvicultural and game management concepts took place in Bavaria.
Traditional forest management for timber production is also applied to protective mountain forests. In subsidised projects for mountain forest restoration in Austria, wind-throw areas were treated traditionally, which included the clearing of the site followed by afforestation. In a few cases, however, the timber thrown by the storm had been left on site because there was insufficient capacity for 'salvage logging'. On such 'low-intervention' sites forest regeneration was much better than on cleared sites. Clear cuts are traditionally seen as normal treatments, and therefore accepted also by forest officials, although they are unfavourable with regard to natural hazard protection. Clear cuts are judged positively because they are intentional actions; wind-throw is regarded as damaging - as nature disturbing planned forest management.
The language chosen by forest officials shows how management measures and natural 'catastrophes' are assessed: wind-throw areas are often called areas 'cleared' by storms, although the storm alone did not actually clear the ground - this is eventually done by the forest workers who remove the timber from the site. It was not the natural incident but human intervention that produced bare ground. Although this treatment leads to the risk of erosion and avalanches, it is subsidised for the sake of mountain forest restoration. Catastrophes and interventions have to be judged in different ways in protective forests and in production forests; wind-throw areas and bark beetles damaging production forests are not necessarily dangerous in protective forests. Foresters may reduce or change measures, but they are still aiming for 'controlled' stand development. In their view, a 'non-intervention' administrative variant does not exist; even if no measures are taken, the treatment of the sites has at least to be planned and observed.
The behaviour of forest officials and their perception of risks in mountain forests is strongly guided by beliefs that evolved in the past when timber production was of prior importance - the old concepts of forest management are still applied to the new problem, but evaluation shows that the strategy does not often seem adequate for the current situation in mountain forests. Changing societal demands and new knowledge put pressure on the traditional concepts of the forestry administration. While this may lead to a change in problem solving strategies, a change of value systems is not necessarily brought about.
Interests
Organizational interests and the 'right' definition of protection
A subsidy programme for protection forest restoration was started recently in Austria as a joint programme of the forest authority and the Torrent and Avalanche Control Service (TACS). A conflict arose over the objectives of the programme; the forest authority wanted to take measures in 'protection forests' – site-protective forests, according to the Austrian Forest Act of 1975, while the TACS directed their activity towards forests with 'protective functions' – the direct protection of settlements and infrastructure against natural hazards like avalanches and rock-fall. This conflict was partly due to the unclear definition of the term 'protection forest' ('Schutzwald') in Austria. The term 'protection' in connection with forest comprises two aspects: the protection of mountain forests against harmful uses (protected forest), and the protective function carried out by mountain forests against natural forces (protective forest). Moreover, protective effects may refer to the forest site itself (protection of the soil against erosion and degradation) or to properties situated below the forest (protection against natural hazards).
Regulations of the Forest Act refer to both categories of protection. While it defines 'protection forests' as protected forests protecting their sites against erosion, it also aims at maintaining the protective effects of forests against natural hazards. As protection forests often (but not necessarily) have positive effects on both site protection and protection of neighbouring properties, foresters usually do not distinguish between the two meanings of protection in colloquial usage. The ambiguous meaning of 'protection forest' is not clarified in practice because the confusion is used politically. The conflict between the two organizations was not only over words; the struggle over the 'correct' definition of terms and objectives was motivated by organizational interests - the two institutions competed for resources and influence. The term 'protection forest' describes the territory of the forest authority, the term 'protective function' defines the competence of the TACS. Setting the political goal for 'protection forest' would strengthen the legitimacy of the forest authority, while defining the 'protective functions' as more important would support the TACS. Eventually, one of the players would receive more funding.
Prittwitz (1990) describes the 'catastrophe paradox' as a phenomenon where policy measures (e.g. clean air policy) often do not correspond to the 'objective' problem situation (air pollution). One explanation for this paradoxical behaviour is that public administrations choose their goals and actions not primarily depending on the 'objective' significance of the problem, but rather according to their own problem solving capacity; the problem perception is influenced by the means at their disposal. This can also be observed in the restoration of protection forests, as the two organizations approach the problem differently; while the forest authority supports silvicultural measures, the TACS tends to prefer constructional means.
Institutional change as a solution?
Official papers of the forestry administration praise the contribution of forests to preventing avalanches and floods, while most experts say that severe floods will always also occur independently of vegetation cover. Historically, the establishment of the forestry administration in Austria's mountain provinces was argued by the importance of the mountain forests in protecting against natural hazards. Although the foresters in the 18th and 19th centuries knew the limits of the protective effects of the forests in fighting floods, they exaggerated their role; the protective role of the forest was used as a political argument for legitimizing the forest staff. Although an extensive forest staff was employed, no more measures were taken in these provinces to protect the forests, than in others. Pfister and Brändli (1999), studied a similar case in Switzerland; after severe lowland floods in the nineteenth century, foresters argued for afforestation in the uplands, claiming that the cause was fast water runoff from deforested areas in the mountains. The newly organized foresters in Switzerland used this oversimplified causality for political goals and succeeded with their claims for a federal forest law. With the enactment of the Swiss Forest Police Act in 1876 they achieved institutionalization.
The Austrian Empire’s Forest Act of 1852 is often argued to be a result of the high importance of the mountain forests for hazard prevention, however, not many regulations refer to the protective effects of the forest. On the contrary, the Forest Act is primarily oriented at the goal of timber production and until now the main share of forestry subsidies have been paid for economic, not ecological purposes. With its main focus on timber production, the objective of today’s Forest Act - to maintain the protective functions of the forests - is only symbolic. Foresters do not look at specific mechanisms in the way forests reduce risks, but assume that forests in general have positive effects in preventing natural hazards; projects aimed at the restoration of protection forests are often carried out on sites that do not significantly contribute to the prevention of natural hazards, but rather serve the interests of the forest owners. Even where ecological or social problems are concerned, the behaviour of public agencies is oriented towards the economic interests of their main client (Wolf, 1986; Krott, 1990).
The organizational interests of the forestry administration outbalance the formal goals of the Forest Act as far as maintaining the protective effects of the forest is concerned. An institutional change that mobilizes the interests of the stakeholders could alter policy by changing the decision-making process. The participation of beneficiaries in decision-making could activate latent interests in the protective effects of the forest. This could be achieved by the financial involvement of beneficiaries in restoration projects and/or political participation. A participation process would provide a voice for people with different perceptions of the problem.
Conclusions
There are different answers (to the question of whether mountain forests produce risks if not managed) corresponding to different groups due to their different underlying value systems and organizational interests. Institutions shape the perception of risks in mountain forests and the conception of measures and strategies to reduce risks. Risk perceptions partly depend on knowledge and may therefore be modified by new scientific findings. As knowledge is always incomplete and uncertain, perceptions will always depend partly on unconscious beliefs. Moreover, risk decisions also include personal value judgements and cost-benefit calculations. Disagreements in risk assessment caused by values and interests cannot be resolved by science. These conflicts are the matter of political processes.
Social science can contribute to an understanding and estimation of how far perceptions are based on either knowledge or beliefs. Policy research can furthermore explain how political decisions are influenced by the interests and the values of political actors. The examples in this article show how deeply their interests and values determine the behaviour of political organizations. This may lead to inadequate problem perceptions and consequently to unsuccessful problem-solving strategies. A fundamental change of risk perceptions and decisions, however, can only be expected in case of paradigm changes within institutions or changes in the decision-making processes.
There is a lack of social and political science research in the field of natural hazard prevention. Scientists and officials are not very aware of the political qualities and value implications of risk analyses as well as silvicultural concepts. In their rationalist approach, experts expect policy scientists to define social or policy goals, but socio-political science cannot replace politics. Instead of being normative, policy research could contribute with empirical-analytical studies of existing and new policy approaches. Policy process research (e.g. the role of institutions or values and interests of political actors) could promote a better understanding of the reality of existing policies, and exploration of new political problem solving strategies (e.g. public participation) could lead to advanced solutions.
References:
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